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This article is drawn from TealGroup's World Military Unmanned Aerial Systems, 2023/2024 Market Profile & Forecast
Russian UAV systems have been shrouded in secrecy for many years, and it has only been in the past few years that any significant amount of information has emerged. Even now, there are many unanswered questions about their programs.
In 2000-2010, most Russian UAV programs were either in limbo, or barely funded. The Russian Armed Forces suffered through a “procurement holiday,” since the late 1990s with few or no systems being manufactured. The Shmel had been offered for sale as were several other UAVs at international air shows, but with little evidence of sales. Part of the problem has been that many of the systems were based around older UAV concepts, using wet-film recovery systems instead of offering real-time intelligence. In view of its prominence in the world aviation industry, it is quite remarkable that Russia had to turn to Israel and Iran to buy UAVs.
The main market for Russian UAVs in the 2000s was the civil/government sector, particularly for border patrol, pipeline security and other paramilitary applications. There was a standing requirement for a modest number of systems for the MVD state police for use in patrolling the Olympic winter games in Sochi.
The short and one-sided war with Georgia in 2008 was a wake-up call to the Russian Army about the backwardness of its drone fleet. The Georgian Armed Forces had acquired a modest number of drones from Israel and used them with some success in 2008 despite their eventual defeat against their much larger Russian opponent. The post-Georgian drone programs saw their first display in the 2014 Donbas war against Ukraine. This war was dominated by artillery use and the Russians had considerable success in using drones for artillery spotting and post-strike evaluations. Russia also used drones extensively in Syria though this was more a field-demonstration of new systems.
The war in Ukraine starting in February 2022 has been the largest commitment of Russian drones to date. The Russian operations have been largely overshadowed by the more publicized Ukrainian use of drones. As in the 2014-2021 Donbas war, the current war has seen extensive use of drones by Russia for artillery reconnaissance. Russia has been slower than Ukraine to deploy quadcopters for small unit observation, though this has changed in recent months with extensive use of Mavic and other quadcopter drones obtained off-the-shelf from China.
Russian losses to date have numbered nearly 5,000 of which about 3,500 have been quadcopters and other mini-UAVs, and the remainder larger winged UAVs in the mini-UAS and STUAS categories. Russian use of larger MALE drones has been limited so far as is known.
The future of the Russian drone program will be closely tied to the eventual outcome of the Ukraine war. A lingering war and continued Western (and Chinese) sanctions will badly impact the Russian aviation industry’s ability to make up for combat losses.
Russian firms have attempted to expand production to fulfill war needs and to supplement some categories such as quadcopters that have been imported until now. The main stumbling block has been the Russian reliance on the import of many key components, especially guidance systems and sensors. It is unclear whether Russian industry will be able to fill this gap or whether production will be limited to grey market import of necessary sub-components.
Any forecast of Russian drone acquisition is highly speculative in view of the status of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. An attritional struggle could last for years, end abruptly due to a sudden collapse of either Army, or peter out into a small-scale war as occurred in the Donbas after the initial 2014 Russian invasion.
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